Elections in 2016

There are a number of important elections across Africa scheduled for 2016 and over the next year, Africa Integrity Insights will examine a selection of these. As an introduction to the upcoming publications we have compiled a list of countries where elections are set to take place in 2016, including the scheduled date (when available) and the type of election.

  • Benin: Presidential (28th February)
  • Burkina Faso: Municipal (31st January)
  • Cape Verde: Parliamentary and Presidential (February & August)
  • Central African Republic: Parliamentary and Presidential Run-off (31st January)
  • Chad: Presidential (April)
  • Côte d’Ivoire: Parliamentary (December)
  • Comoros: Presidential (21st February)
  • Congo-Brazzaville: Presidential (20th March)
  • Democratic Republic of Congo: Legislative and Presidential (27th November)
  • Djibouti: Presidential (April)
  • Equatorial Guinea: Presidential (November)
  • Gabon: Parliamentary and Presidential (December)
  • Gambia: Presidential (1st December)
  • Ghana: Parliamentary and Presidential (7th November)
  • Niger: Parliamentary & Presidential and Local (21st February & 9th May)
  • Rwanda: Local Government (8th, 22nd & 27th February and 22nd March)
  • Sao Tome and Principe: Presidential (July)
  • Senegal: Constitutional Referendum (May)
  • South Africa: Municipal (May-August)
  • Sudan: Darfur Referendum (11th April)
  • Tanzania: Zanzibar Re-run (20th March)
  • Tunisia: Municipal and Regional (30th October)
  • Uganda: General (18th February)
  • Zambia: Legislative and Presidential (11th August)
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Francophone Africa Revisited

Artist's Map of Africa

On 17th March 2015 we published an article entitled “Troubles en Afrique Francophonie” which discussed increasing anti-government protests across Francophone Africa, not seen in either Anglophone or Lusophone regions. We assessed that in our globalised world it appears that language still has an important influence on the contagion effect of political protest. The countries we identified as experiencing unrest over the past year were Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Niger and Togo. Since then: unrest has intensified in Burundi leading to an attempted coup on 13th May 2015; Gabon has been beset by a series of protests and strikes; and violent clashes have erupted between opposition supporters and the security forces in Guinea’s capital Conakry.

In stark contrast, unrest and political protests have been muted in Anglophone and Lusophone Africa. Despite deteriorating economic conditions in Ghana, allegations of mass killings by the security forces in Angola, and the continuation of the rule of two of Africa’s longest serving ‘Strongmen’ in Uganda and Zimbabwe, these countries have largely avoided anti-government protests like those seen in Francophone Africa. Although South Africa experienced unrest caused by xenophobic, or ‘afrophobic’, riots in April 2015, these were not protests aimed at the government and therefore less dangerous to the ruling ANC.

The unrest seen in Francophone Africa over the past year is particularly anti-government in nature. Protestors have called for greater democracy, criticising long term rulers and those who they believe are exploiting their positions of power in order to prolong their rule. The protests appear to be well co-ordinated by highly active civil society groups and opposition parties which possess clear aims. This is therefore much more of a threat to ruling parties and presidents.

It is not clear why this unrest has been a particular feature of Francophone Africa but it seems that different movements have taken inspiration from each other. It is possible that this has spread through the reporting of events on social or conventional media, which has been expedited by a shared language. However, it is also possible that it has been caused by increased co-operation between different civil society groups. There was an indication that this could be the case in March 2015, when 40 pro-democracy activists were arrested in the DRC, including members of Senegalese and Burkinabe civil society groups. Thus, it could be that civil society groups in Francophone Africa are beginning to operate transnationally; sharing ideas, experiences and acting as inspirations for movements in other countries.

Nonetheless, whatever the reason behind the increasing unrest it appears that Francophone Africa’s autocratic leaders are going to face continued protests in 2015.

Troubles en Afrique Francophonie

Artist's Map of Africa

Following the overthrow of Burkina Faso’s Blaise Compaore in October last year a number of other Francophone countries have experienced anti-government protests, predominantly in relation to the tenure of their long-term leaders. In the midst of the events in Burkina Faso commentators coined the phrase “African Spring” drawing comparisons with the Arab uprisings in 2011. However, it appears that “Printemps Africain” is a more appropriate term than “African Spring”.

In the last year and predominantly after the events in Burkina Faso, large-scale unrest has been seen in Burundi, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Niger and Togo. With the exception of Cote d’Ivoire, where protests came from within the military concerning pay, the other countries witnessed protests against their long-term governments and presidents. As recently as February 2015, protests against Burundi’s government broke out in reaction to the arrest of journalist, Bob Rugurika, in connection with a murder investigation. Witnesses said that the demonstration which took place after Rugurika’s release was the largest in the country in over 20 years. Evidently, these types of events are not on the same scale as those seen during the “Arab Spring” but nonetheless, they do demonstrate a rising undercurrent of unrest.

Significantly, Anglophone and Lusophone Africa have managed to avoid these powerful rumblings of discontent. However, this is not due to a lack of dictatorial zeal on the part of these regions’ leaders, as demonstrated by three out of the five longest serving African presidents being from either Anglophone or Lusophone Africa. Burundi’s Pierre Nkurunziza with his mere 10 years as president must look in envy as the nonagenarian Robert Mugabe enters his 35th year in power.

Thus, on the surface at least, it appears that in our increasingly globalised world of the Internet and social media, language still has an influence on the contagion effect of political protest. It is not clear whether this is through conventional or social media, or links between civil society organisations, but it does seem that it has so far been confined to the Francophone region in which it originated. If this trend continues, 2015 could be an uncomfortable year for Francophone Africa’s longest serving leaders in Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and elsewhere.

[The above is an extract from Africa Integrity’s new quarterly newsletter – Africa Integrity Reports – which is to be launched in March 2015. To request a copy of this newsletter and join the mailing list please contact us]

Elections in 2015: Cote d’Ivoire

In November 2014, Cote d’Ivoire was struck by protests which highlighted the fragile nature of the country’s armed forces. The protestors, who were former rebels now serving in the army, demanded that the government pay back wages and overdue benefits. The soldiers erected barricades and blocked streets outside army barracks across a number of cities, including the commercial capital Abidjan. Although the protests were eventually resolved peacefully, after the government agreed to meet the soldiers’ demands, the incident raises concerns over the command structure within the army. Due to Cote d’Ivoire’s army being made up of an amalgam of rebel forces following the country’s civil war it lacks a clear chain of command. Commentators have argued that a number of different chains of command exist within the armed forces and that there is little control over these from the civilian government. This has created a dangerous situation as soldiers from different rebel groups have varying grievances and it is likely that they have been emboldened by the protests in November.

As the election approaches soldiers may take the opportunity to air these grievances through protests similar to those seen in November in the knowledge that the president would be under pressure to resolve the disputes as quickly as possible so as to not damage his re-election campaign. If this situation arises, the likelihood of violence will increase dramatically due to the protestors being former rebels. Facing such a threat the government would probably try to placate the soldiers through meeting their demands so as to avoid civil conflict. However, this could have an impact on the civilian population as, if soldiers’ financial demands are met, the government may look to offset it through cuts in public spending. This could potentially give rise to civilian protests and social unrest, which was also seen in November 2014 following the government’s ban of plastic bags used to carry water. The protesters argued that the policy would lead to job losses and restrict the public’s access to clean drinking water. Thus, Cote d’Ivoire’s election in 2015 is likely to be a focal point of protests for both soldiers and civilians and could potentially be marred by large-scale social unrest.

[The above is an extract from a comprehensive report on the political outlook for Africa in 2015 which will be distributed to clients in the New Year]