Ramaphosa Plays Politics

Since becoming the leader of the ANC in December 2017 and president of South Africa in February, Cyril Ramaphosa’s ability to turn around South Africa’s fortunes has been increasingly called in to question. He was widely seen as the antidote to economic decline under Jacob Zuma but, following re-emergence of the land redistribution controversy, confidence in Ramaphosa is waning, especially amongst investors. However, when Ramaphosa’s decisions are examined in the context of 2019’s election, a different, far more encouraging, picture emerges.

Since its electoral highwater mark in 2004, support for the ANC has declined at every general and local election. This decline was particularly pronounced in municipal elections in 2016, when the ANC lost control of major municipalities and its vote share dropped below 55 percent for the first time. Worryingly for the ANC, local elections provide a strong indication of the ANC’s performance at subsequent general elections. In 2006, the ANC secured 66.3 percent of the vote in the municipal elections and, in 2009, it obtained 65.9 percent of the vote at the general election. In 2011, the ANC secured 61.95 percent of the vote in the municipal elections and, in 2014, it obtained 62.15 percent of the vote in the general election. If this pattern continues, the ANC is on course to secure some 55% in next year’s election; a matter of which Ramaphosa is no doubt acutely aware.

The ANC’s decision to support the Economic Freedom Fighters’ (EFF) motion on land expropriation without compensation must be seen within this context. Ramaphosa recognises that land redistribution is an important matter for the ANC’s base and that any perceived opposition to it would be used by the EFF to discredit him. Before he even became president, it was clear that the EFF planned to portray Ramaphosa as being out of touch with normal South Africans and supportive of ‘White’ economic interests. As its leader – Julius Malema – stated in early February, “What we were doing with Zuma, it was a picnic […] Wait and see what is going to happen with Ramaphosa. What we are going to do to White monopoly capital”.

Consequently, it is unsurprising that Ramaphosa supported the motion, with two effects. First, it helps to protect Ramaphosa and the ANC from EFF criticism ahead of next year’s election. And, second, it helps to weaken the two main opposition parties – the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the EFF. Although the DA and the EFF formed an unlikely alliance in opposing Zuma, this has rapidly broken down since the land expropriation motion, which was opposed by the DA. Accordingly, the EFF has focused its criticism on the DA and is currently trying to remove its mayor in Nelson Mandela Bay – Athol Trollip.

With the DA and EFF at loggerheads, Ramaphosa and the ANC have undermined both parties. In February, the ANC helped to protect the DA’s Mayor of Cape Town – Patricia de Lille – from a motion of no confidence brought by her own party. This was embarrassing for the DA and revealed divisions in the party’s Western Cape stronghold. In March, Ramaphosa invited Malema to re-join the ANC. Although some commentators saw this as further evidence of an ANC lurch to the left, it is more likely that this was a tactical decision to undermine the EFF. Ramaphosa described the ANC as the “home” of EFF supporters and, after backing its motion, he seemingly challenged the need for its existence. The EFF will become increasingly radical in its policies and rhetoric to distance itself from the ANC. This will damage its electoral appeal and, given that it has already been described by sections of the South African media as a “fascist” party, should ensure that it does not pose a significant threat to the ANC’s dominance.

Regarding the land expropriation motion, despite the panic it has invoked, it is unlikely that it will be applied aggressively. There is little reason to believe Ramaphosa will pursue a policy akin to that of neighbouring Zimbabwe. He understands the effect that the policy could have on South Africa’s economy and he has made it clear that his priority is to protect it. Given racial inequalities in South Africa, it is unsurprising that such a motion has widespread support and it should be considered positive that its potential implementation will be overseen by Ramaphosa. The former union leader turned business tycoon has always been able to adopt a range of guises and straddle different groups. Ultimately, he is a pragmatic political negotiator; the type of character which is needed to oversee a potentially explosive matter.

Thus, although it seemed that the land expropriation motion was a victory for the EFF and the far left, it appears that Ramaphosa is using it to the ANC’s advantage. It is highly unlikely that the president will pursue Malema’s interpretation of the policy. Rather, its implementation will most probably be the result of a well thought through process. In the meantime, Ramaphosa will use land redistribution to weaken the opposition and help stem the ANC’s decline. While it is unlikely that Ramaphosa will be able to halt a long-term decline in the ANC’s fortunes, his manoeuvres may mean that next year’s election will be better than those of 2016.

This article originally featured in Africa Integrity’s April 2018 Newsletter. To join our newsletter mailing list, please contact us.

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A Look Ahead to April 2018

Gambia’s Road to Democracy

On 12th April, the Gambia will hold its first municipal election since the fall of Yahya Jammeh, who lost the presidential election in late 2016. This represents another step towards strengthening democracy in the small nation after a successful parliamentary election in April 2017. As the chairman of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) – Alieu Momarr Njai – stated last year, the municipal elections are a “key pillar in promoting and building grass roots democracy” in the Gambia. While EU observers identified shortcomings in the electoral legal framework following last year’s parliamentary election, it recognised that these were “offset” by broad trust in the IEC and genuine political competition. They concluded that “goodwill on behalf of the people and institutions of the Gambia provided for the restoration of key democratic rights”. Undoubtedly, democratic reforms are still needed, as too much power continues to lie with the president; however, it is expected that the Ministry of Justice’s constitutional review should bring about such reforms. Although more needs to be done to engage the electorate, as there was only a 42 percent turnout last year, next month’s election is set to be another free, fair and peaceful election in this fledgling democracy.

Politically speaking, next month’s election is extremely important for the former ruling party – Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC) – which lost 43 of its 48 seats in the 58-member National Assembly. Given the APRC’s association with Jammeh, it is likely that it will experience similar losses in the municipal elections, which could spell the end of its role in Gambian politics. While Adama Barrow won the presidential election as a representative of an opposition coalition, after this coalition separated, it was his party – the United Democratic Party (UDP) – which dominated last year’s election, securing 31 seats in the National Assembly. Although progress has been slow, the UDP is expected to perform well again, in light of the praise bestowed on Barrow by the IMF for stabilising and strengthening the economy. However, the long-term maintenance of such support will be largely dependent on the UDP’s ability to reduce unemployment in the Gambia, particularly amongst the country’s youth.

Counter-terrorism Conference Converges in Algeria   

Late last year, the African Union (AU) announced that Algeria would be the coordinator of its counter-terrorism strategy and, on 9th April, the country will host a conference on counter-terrorism in Africa. The conference is expected to be attended by high-level political and security officials from across the continent and it is seen as an opportunity for different countries to exchange ideas about counter-terrorism strategies. Such a conference opens the possibility of broadening co-operation between different countries, which is vital in the fight against terrorism on the continent. The majority of terrorist organisations active in Africa have a regional, rather than national, focus and have launched attacks across the continent’s porous borders. Consequently, regional co-operation will be important for any counter-terrorism strategies. Furthermore, the conference will specifically address cross-border terrorist-financing and ways in which different countries’ security apparatuses can restrict funding sources.

In March 2017, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation reported that terrorist attacks had grown by 1000 percent in Africa since 2006 and, considering the attacks in Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Somalia earlier this month, there is little sign of this slowing. Countries have begun to recognise the importance of regional co-operation, which was shown by the meeting of the heads of intelligence agencies from 13 East African countries in Kampala on 19th March; however, much more is needed. While the G5 Sahel Taskforce exists in northwest Africa, Algeria has been criticised for not supporting its operations, supposedly because it considers it a tool of France. Algeria has also been criticised by Morocco for its lack of co-operation in counter-terrorism initiatives in North Africa. The country was chosen by the AU because of its “pioneering experience” of dealing with terrorism and hopefully next month’s conference will demonstrate its desire to share this experience and represent the beginning of a greater level of continental co-operation on security matters.

Elections in the Ashes of Gabon’s Democracy

In the aftermath of the disputed 2016 presidential election, Gabon’s National Assembly was set on fire by opposition demonstrators. Images of this event became a symbol of the heated dispute between the government and opposition, which is continuing to engulf Gabonese politics. While the building has been repaired, for many in the opposition, little has been done to address what it represents. Despite only narrowly defeating Jean Ping by less than two percentage points, President Ali Bongo Ondimba has increased presidential powers over the last two years and failed to make any headway in negotiations with the opposition. In January 2018, changes were made to the constitution, which, not only removed presidential term-limits and provided Ali Bongo with immunity from prosecution, but also enabled the president to determine the policy of the nation without government or parliamentary consultation. Consequently, political power in Gabon is now firmly concentrated around Ali Bongo.

Since the presidential election, Gabon’s National Assembly election has been postponed twice because of the failure of reconciliation talks between the government and opposition and is now scheduled to take place before the end of April. The ruling Gabonese Democratic Party dominate the National Assembly holding 115 of the 121 seats; a majority used by Ali Bongo to increase presidential powers. Given its performance in the presidential election, there were strong indications that the opposition Coalition for the New Republic (CNR) would be able to end this dominance. However, in light of the weakening of the National Assembly’s role in Gabonese politics, it appears that the coalition is fragmenting. Nine of the twelve parties in the coalition have called for a boycott of the election, while other senior CNR figures met with the Minister of the Interior in early March to discuss preparation for them. Significantly, the coalition’s presidential flag-bearer has remained silent on this matter. Accordingly, it appears that the Gabonese Democratic Party’s dominance is not under significant threat.

Despite the election being less than a month away, there has been little preparation for it. The Gabonese Elections Centre, which is meant to manage the election, has not yet been established and, given that its chairperson is meant to be selected by the government and opposition, it is increasingly unlikely that it will be ready to run the election. There are growing calls for the election to be postponed again amid concerns that it could descend into violence. Although this will do little to address the underlying political tension in the country and only enable it to continue to build, if the election goes ahead, it is likely to cause widespread social unrest as elements of the opposition come out in protest.

Africa Integrity Foresight: Democracy Dawning in the DRC?

 

DRC flag

In the second paper of our ‘Foresight’ series, Michael Kearsey examines the outlook for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2018, in light of the political crisis in the country, which has now entered its third year, and upcoming elections in December. Questions continue to be asked about President Joseph Kabila’s future and it seems that many of these will be answered this year. There is a growing sense of urgency in the messages we have received from sources in-country and the wider region, which indicate that changes are afoot. Although political changes have always been associated with violence in the DRC, there is reason to believe that this time may be different, and we could be looking at the dawning of democracy in the DRC.  This paper sets out a case for optimism.

To request a copy of this paper, please contact us.

 

A Look Ahead to March 2018

A Three Horse Race in Sierra Leone

On 7th March 2018, Sierra Leone will go to the polls to vote for the country’s next president. The incumbent – Ernest Bai Koroma – of the ruling All People’s Congress (APC) is standing down after serving two terms, in line with the country’s constitution. Although he will no longer serve as president, sources from within the APC have informed Africa Integrity that Koroma wants to continue to influence the new administration, if the APC are victorious. This is illustrated by both his role in the selection of the APC’s presidential candidate and his desire to continue as chairman of the party. Although the party’s candidate was meant to be chosen through a democratic process, Koroma unilaterally selected the Minister of Foreign Affairs – Samura Kamara – as the APC’s candidate. Thus, it seems that, if Kamara wins, he will maintain the status quo and it is likely that Koroma will continue to govern from behind the scenes.

Kamara will face 15 candidates from other parties in the election, but only two are likely to pose real competition. These are Julius Maada Bio from the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), who also ran in 2012, and Kandeh Yumkella from the newly formed National Grand Coalition (NGC). Outside of military rule, Sierra Leonean politics has been dominated by the APC and SLPP. However, since Yumkella left the SLPP in September 2017 and formed the NGC, there are indications that this is starting to change. He has shown himself to be a very popular candidate in urban Sierra Leone, particularly in Freetown, where he has been drawing large crowds of supporters. The APC are evidently concerned about the threat posed by Yumkella and have petitioned the Supreme Court to bar him from taking part in the election because of his previous dual citizenship. This attempt has already been dismissed by the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and it is likely that the Supreme Court will follow suit. Although it is unlikely that Yumkella will be able to win the election outright, due to the established bases of the APC and SLPP, by turning the election into a three-horse race, it is highly likely that it will go to a run-off. In such a scenario, Yumkella will be an in a very influential position.

While there have been some instances of political violence during the campaign, these have tended to be isolated and there is not a significant threat of unrest. Importantly, the NEC is considered an independent organisation and the country’s recent elections have all been deemed credible. However, this is the first election since the departure of the UN Mission in 2014 and, given the APC’s attempt to prevent Yumkella from standing, if it goes to a run-off, political tensions will be very high, which could cause isolated instances of unrest and violence.

Time’s up for Zimbabweans on Mnangagwa’s Name and Shame List

In late November 2017, Zimbabwe’s new president – Emmerson Mnangagwa – declared an amnesty for individuals and companies involved in the misappropriation of public funds and the illegal externalisation of this money. He stated that “The government of Zimbabwe is gazetting a three-month moratorium within which those involved in the malpractice can bring back the funds and assets, with no questions being asked or charges preferred against them”. However, he said that “upon expiry of the three-month window, the government will proceed to effect arrest of all those who would not have complied with this directive and will ensure that they are prosecuted in terms of the country’s laws”. At a Zanu-PF Central Committee meeting in December 2017, Mnangagwa added that “I have a list of who took money out. So, in March when the period expires, those who would not have heeded my moratorium I will name and shame them”. Consequently, it appears that time is up for those on Mnangagwa’s “list”. Although such an anti-corruption initiative will have a positive effect, given Mnangagwa’s chequered past, it seems unlikely that this will be a comprehensive initiative. Rather, there is a strong possibility that Mnangagwa will use this opportunity to damage the reputations of potential adversaries, particularly within Zanu-PF, ahead of this year’s election.

Sissi Set for Another Victory in Egypt

On 26th March 2018, Egypt will hold its second presidential election since the 2013 coup, which removed the country’s first democratically elected president – Mohamed Morsi. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who secured over 95 percent of the vote in 2014, is the favourite to win the election and will face only one contender – Moussa Mostafa Moussa – the leader of the El-Ghad Party. Although a number of candidates intended to run against Sissi, Moussa was the only one to officially submit his candidacy. Many of the other candidates were forced to drop out of the race due to threats from the government, and some were even arrested. Consequently, the remaining opposition candidates declared a boycott of the election. Despite proclaiming that he “will not be a background actor”, most oppositionists do not consider Moussa a genuine candidate because of his support of Sissi. Rather, he is seen as merely standing in order to provide an air of legitimacy to the election.

The government has been heavily criticised for its treatment of opposition candidates by human rights groups. It has been accused of exploiting its counterterrorism laws to stifle opposition activities and conduct arbitrary arrests. Such arrests are continuing to take place as Egypt’s Prosecutor General has called for investigations into the parties boycotting the election. Interestingly, those prevented from running in the election included senior military figures, such as retired Lieutenant General Sami Hafez Anan, who was arrested after announcing his intention to stand, and Colonel Ahmed Konsowa, who was sentenced to six years of imprisonment for expressing political opinions as a serving officer. This restriction of Egypt’s democratic space, alongside the persecution of senior military figures, has the potential to cause problems for Sissi in the medium term, as groups are increasingly likely to reject the democratic process as a means of expressing political opinion.

While there is no doubt that Sissi will win this month’s election, the tactics adopted by the government and security services, although effective in impeding the opposition in the short-term, could create serious problems going forward. As the government struggles to reduce the growing terrorism threat emanating from the Sinai region, pressure on Sissi will increase during his second term, which could lead to unrest and political instability.

Is Kabila Finally Preparing to Step Down?

DRC flagSurrounded by accusations of wanting to alter the constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in order to remove presidential terms limits, President Joseph Kabila has refused to stand down since the end of his second term in December 2016. Although Kabila has had to contend with anti-government protests since then, it appears that regional, rather than domestic, pressure may be what finally convinces him to step down and allow a democratic transition to take place.  

Since the violent suppression of anti-government protests in January 2018, there have been signs that Kabila is inclining towards a more conciliatory position. On 26th January 2018, Kabila held his first press conference in five years and reiterated his commitment to holding elections by December this year. Although he refused to accept responsibility for the violence and took a swipe at the opposition, such a public proclamation is a rare occurrence and indicates that Kabila recognises that the electoral process cannot be delayed further. While Kabila did not address the ever-increasing calls for him to stand-down, his Minister of Communications – Lambert Mende – addressed this issue in an interview in early February. In the interview, Mende asserted that Kabila does not intend to stand in this year’s election or to choose a successor and rule by proxy. He said that “this is not a kingdom […], it is a democratic republic”. Although Mende’s comments have received significant attention in international media, it should be noted that he reportedly backtracked on them later, when speaking to Congolese media. Nevertheless, such confusion at least suggests that Kabila is unsure about running again.

Despite criticising the opposition during his press conference and insinuating that they will cause the DRC to descend into “chaos”, there are signs that Kabila is willing to re-open negotiations with opposition figures and adopt a more placatory stance. This is demonstrated by the proposed release of two prominent political prisoners – Jean Claude Muyambo and Eugène Diomi Ndongala. At the time of writing, both prisoners are expected to be released on 20th February 2018. There is an expectation that this could lead to the release of more political prisoners and maybe even the dropping of charges against Moïse Katumbi, the former governor of Katanga, who announced his presidential candidacy on 2nd January 2018. Although there is little indication of this happening in the short-term, Africa Integrity has been informed that Kabila has offered an olive branch to Archbishop Laurent Monsengwo – a figurehead of the protests in January, which were backed by the Catholic Church in the DRC. According to our sources, Monsengwo has been invited by Kabila to discuss ways to “revive” the December 31st Saint-Sylvestre Agreement between the government and opposition. This readiness to reengage with the opposition is a radical change in approach from Kabila, which could be an indication of his willingness to step aside.

The Catholic Church’s support for anti-government protests is undoubtedly significant, given that around 50 percent of the DRC’s population is Catholic. Moreover, Africa Integrity understands that other religious groups have been following the Catholic Church’s example. Nevertheless, according to our sources, it is Kabila’s loss of regional support that has had a greater effect on his apparent change in approach. It is understood that Kabila has had to reassess his position since the fall of two of his powerful regional allies: Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe; and Jacob Zuma in South Africa. In spite of international pressure, both of these individuals were unwavering in their support of Kabila since December 2016. For example, in June 2017, Zuma invited Kabila to South Africa and publicly pledged his support for the embattled president. We have been informed that since Mugabe and Zuma resigned, Kabila has started to feel increasingly “isolated” and has begun to re-evaluate his future.

Although Kabila can still count on the support of President Yoweri Museveni in Uganda, Paul Kagame in Rwanda and Edgar Lungu in Zambia, Museveni and Kagame are facing increasing criticism for their alleged support of rebel groups in the DRC and Lungu is preoccupied by an opposition which aims to prevent him from standing in the next election in Zambia. Furthermore, Kabila’s close ties with Congo-Brazzaville and Angola seem to be weakening. The pressure put on these countries, especially Angola, by the influx of refugees from the DRC, has put strain on their governments’ relationships with Kabila. It has been reported that the ruling MPLA in Angola, which has previously provided much needed military support to Kabila, will no longer be willing to intervene directly in the country, particularly under its new president – João Lourenço. Similarly, given the current instability in Congo-Brazzaville, it is highly unlikely that President Denis Sassou Nguesso will be in a position to support his neighbour. Senior political sources in Congo-Brazzaville and Angola have confirmed that both Lourenço and Sassou Nguesso have recently informed Kabila that they will not intervene on his behalf and that they support elections going ahead this year.

Along with the fall of Mugabe and Zuma, this constitutes a loss of regional backing for Kabila, leaving him increasingly exposed. It appears that Kabila has begun to realise that, without regional support, elections cannot be delayed any further, and it will be extremely difficult for him to stand again. After his motorcade was involved in two accidents in February, suspicions of assassination plots are rife, and it seems that Kabila sees a more conciliatory approach towards the opposition as his best means of protection. While Kabila may still try to put his name forward for the election, there are strong indications that he has realised that a third term will not be possible and that he is finally preparing to stand down.

Southern African Dynasties: The Parties Strike Back

Southern African Dynasties

In recent years, political dynasties have received a lot of attention across the African continent as ageing presidents have been accused of trying to manoeuvre family members into the line of succession, to protect them and their interests after they step down. Until last year, it seemed that Angola, Zimbabwe and South Africa could have been following this path; however, the leaders of these countries evidently underestimated the power of their parties.

Decline of Dos Santos

It had long been speculated that Angola’s former President Eduardo dos Santos planned to appoint one of his children, or possibly his nephew, as his successor. After assuming power in 1979, dos Santos inserted his family into Angola’s political and economic hierarchy, and to many, the dos Santos family transcended the ruling MPLA. Consequently, it was expected that a member of the dos Santos family would take over the presidency. However, in December 2016, it was announced that dos Santos’s “hand-picked” successor was former Minister of Defence Joao Lourenco, who, unlike dos Santos family members, had the support of the MPLA.

Given that he was a member of dos Santos’s inner circle, it was widely expected that Lourenco would protect the former First Family’s interests.  However, as Africa Integrity predicted in our July 2017 Newsletter, Lourenco has sought to assert his authority by side-lining members of the dos Santos family. Africa Integrity understands that dos Santos is seriously ill and no longer has the influence he once had over the party, which has seemingly taken the opportunity to reassert itself as the primary organ of power in Angola.

A Fall from Grace

In Zimbabwe, it was a working assumption that Robert Mugabe’s successor would be either Joice Mujuru or Emmerson Mnangagwa – both former Vice Presidents. However, in 2014, Mugabe’s wife – Grace Mugabe – entered Zimbabwean politics and rapidly ascended to ZANU-PF’s politburo. By the end of 2014, Mujuru was removed from her position and later expelled from the party following a factionalist campaign led by Grace Mugabe. After Mujuru was removed, ZANU-PF coalesced into two factions, one aligned with Grace Mugabe, which was dominated by younger party members, and one aligned with Mnangagwa. Although Mnangagwa had more support in the party, on 6th November 2017, Mugabe seemingly cleared the path to the presidency for his wife by sacking Mnangagwa, who subsequently fled the country.

This move appeared to signal the creation of a Mugabe dynasty in Zimbabwe, but it was short lived. On 14th November 2017, the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) seized control of the country and initiated negotiations with Mugabe for his resignation. There was very little resistance to this from within ZANU-PF and the party’s favoured candidate – Mnangagwa – was sworn in as president on 24th November 2017. Given ZANU-PF’s close relationship with the ZDF, the military’s actions cannot be separated from the party’s wishes and, much like the MPLA, it appears that ZANU-PF reasserted its superior influence over that of the Mugabe family.

Not Another Zuma

In contrast to dos Santos and Mugabe, South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma had not been in power as long, nor was his family as entrenched in the political and economic structures of the country. But he also wanted a family member to succeed him: in this case, his ex-wife Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Dlamini-Zuma was a prominent figure in the pro-Zuma faction of the ruling ANC. Her candidacy faced opposition from influential sections of the party, which were acutely aware of the damage caused by corruption allegations against Zuma. But the pro-Zuma faction was very influential in the provincial ANC, which would play a vital role in selecting the party’s new president at the ANC’s National Conference in December 2017. Accordingly, the leadership race between Dlamini-Zuma and Vice President Cyril Ramaphosa was too close to call. But, on 18th December 2017, Ramaphosa narrowly defeated Dlamini-Zuma. Again, this signalled a rejection by the liberation party of a future dominated by Zuma, his allies and his family.

The Power of the Liberation

Although the MPLA, ZANU-PF and ANC are all markedly different political parties, they share a common history of being liberation movements. And it is this shared history that may explain why each of the parties rejected the prospect of family dynasties. In all three countries, liberation credentials remain very important and in Angola and Zimbabwe, the presidents’ preferred successors lacked such credentials. In contrast, Lourenco fought in the Angolan War of Independence and Mnangagwa fought in the Zimbabwe War of Liberation. For many in the MPLA and ZANU-PF, the presidency should be held by individuals with such credentials in their own right.

Although the situation in South Africa was different, as both Ramaphosa and Dlamini-Zuma were anti-Apartheid activists, another important aspect of these liberation struggles is that the movement or party is paramount. In South Africa, Dlamini-Zuma’s victory risked splintering the ANC and potential electoral defeat. Similarly, in Zimbabwe, Grace Mugabe’s leadership would have brought underlying factionalism in ZANU-PF to the surface and, without the support of the ZDF, electoral defeat would have been a very real prospect. While the MPLA was probably in a stronger electoral position, a family dynasty would have further damaged the country’s international reputation and, given Angola’s poor economic situation, this would have posed a threat to the MPLA’s leadership.

Although cults of personality developed around dos Santos and particularly Mugabe, it is important to recognise that their power derived ultimately from their political parties and the military. While the circumstances are different in South Africa, the ANC is still the dominant political force in the country and it can be difficult to differentiate between the party and state. After fighting protracted liberation struggles, the MPLA, ZANU-PF and ANC were not willing to risk their supremacy by allowing family dynasties to emerge. It seems that, amongst the Southern African liberation movements, no individual or family is bigger than the party.

This article originally featured in Africa Integrity’s January 2018 Newsletter. To join our newsletter mailing list, please contact us.

A Look Ahead to February 2018

Guinea’s Long-Awaited Local Elections

After years of delays, President Alpha Conde finally signed a decree on 4th December 2017, agreeing to the election commission’s proposed date for local elections – 4th February 2018. The elections have been expected since 2005 but the government has consistently delayed them and has been criticised by opposition parties for doing so. In 2016, the government, opposition parties and civil society groups engaged in a national political dialogue to resolve the issue; however, President Alpha Conde ignored the agreed date for elections in 2017. According to opposition parties, the government has postponed elections because, under the current system, central government has the power to appoint local government officials. Opposition leaders have alleged that the government has exploited this in order to increase its influence and perpetuate electoral fraud.

Consequently, next month’s local elections are highly significant for Guinea’s political environment. Given their importance, it is likely that political tensions will be very high and, if there are allegations of electoral fraud, there is the potential for widespread protests and social unrest. In 2017, Guinea was beset by political protests in Conakry, riots in Bauxite producing regions and strikes across the country. President Alpha Conde has been accused of responding to these matters in a dictatorial manner and has even interfered with the media’s coverage of such events. Against this strained political atmosphere, the local elections, if mis-managed, could be the catalyst for further unrest.

Zuma’s Last State of the Nation Address

On 8th February 2018, Jacob Zuma is expected to make his final State of the Nation Address as the president of South Africa. Although there has been much speculation about whether he would still be president by this date, it seems that the ruling ANC’s National Executive Committee (NEC) has decided not to force Zuma to stand down before the re-opening of parliament. As the ANC’s Secretary-General Ace Magashule stated, “he will deliver the State of the Nation Address as he is still the president”.  Since the election of Cyril Ramaphosa as president of the ANC in December 2017, he has stamped his authority on the party and emphasised the need to tackle corruption. Given the myriad of corruption allegations associated with Zuma, many expected the ANC to recall Zuma in order to strengthen Ramaphosa’s and the party’s image ahead of next year’s general election.

While there are strong indications that Zuma will be recalled before the end of his term, Ramaphosa has to be cautious as Zuma remains an influential and popular figure within sections of the ANC. The dual power structure created by the separate ANC and State presidential elections has the potential to stall Ramaphosa’s reformist strategy and increase factionalism in the party, which is trying to restore unity after the divisive National Conference in December 2017. Ramaphosa has noted that he does not want to “humiliate President Zuma” and, for the sake of the ANC’s unity, it is important that he is not seen as doing so. But, for its performance in next year’s election, the sooner Zuma is removed, the better. In the meantime, it appears that Zuma will be making his final State of Nation Address on 8th February, which, much like previous years, will almost definitely be disrupted by South Africa’s opposition parties, especially the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), who will relish the opportunity to lambast Zuma in parliament one last time.

Djibouti Goes to the Polls

Legislative elections are set to take place in Djibouti on 23rd February 2018 and it looks likely that the Union pour la Majorité Présidentielle (UMP) will consolidate its position as the country’s ruling party. Ahead of the last National Assembly election in 2013, six opposition parties combined to create the Union pour le Salut National (USN) coalition, which, despite allegations of vote-rigging, managed to secure 21 seats in the 65-seat assembly that was previously fully controlled by the UMP. While there was much hope amongst opposition activists that this signalled a shift in Djibouti’s political landscape, since then, the USN has splintered and become increasingly ineffective. President Ismaïl Guelleh comfortably won Djibouti’s presidential election in 2016 after three parties in the USN coalition boycotted the election and the remaining parties failed to unite behind a single candidate. And, in 2017, the USN did not contest Regional and Communal elections.

There are already reports that at least one party in the USN coalition will boycott the upcoming election and it looks like the UMP will increase its control over the National Assembly. The election will almost certainly be tainted by allegations of intimidation and vote-rigging from the opposition, but, given the strategic importance of Djibouti, it is unlikely that the government will face significant international pressure. Although there is potential for such allegations to cause violent political protests, like those seen in 2013, given the divided nature of the opposition, such protests are unlikely to be widespread or pose any genuine threat to the government.